The current crises are making reinforcement of NATO’s southern flank even more advisable. Such a statement might certainly seem bizarre initially, seeing that attention is focused entirely on Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean does not seem to be a priority theatre. But reality is different because the Atlantic Alliance’s adversaries to the east – Russia and China – are the same ones that it has to face in the south. Reinforcing the southern flank thus ensures a general consolidation of the entire Atlantic Alliance, which otherwise risks being highly vulnerable to the hostile intentions of the Sino-Russian axis. It is thus necessary to go into greater detail, to try to understand why NATO should pay attention to the Mediterranean basin.
In recent years, the influence of Beijing and Moscow in the area has been consolidated. China has strengthened its influence in Algeria, through shrewd vaccination diplomacy and by signing a 7-billion-dollar fertilizer agreement in March with the country. China is also consolidating its soft power over Egypt, also in this case using vaccination diplomacy and being active in the tourism and infrastructure fields. But it was in April 2021 that China signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement with Tunisia. Then in January 2022, China and Morocco signed the plan implementing the Belt and Road Initiative. We recall that in recent years commercial dealings between the two countries have been reinforced and Rabat has also been the object of Chinese vaccine diplomacy.
But also Russia is showing a keen interest in North Africa. Moscow maintains a significant political and military influence in the east of Libya: this is an area that the Russians use amongst other things as a launching pad to extend their influence in the Sahel. It is no coincidence that over the last few months in particular Mali has progressively slid into the Kremlin’s orbit: this could also soon be the fate of Burkina Faso. On top of this, the Sahel is a key crossroads for the flows of migrants towards the European Union: this is an extremely worrying factor. Russia could in future try to use them in order to put Brussels under pressure, according to a modus operandi that was already observed in November 2021, when Moscow and Minsk orchestrated a migration crisis to create tension on the Polish border.
It must also not be forgotten that the food crisis triggered by the invasion of Ukraine will hit Africa and the Middle East hardest: Russia could exploit this fact to manipulate the flows of migrants heading towards the Mediterranean basin.
Beyond the direct targets of China and Russia, a third risk factor is the role of Iran. A close ally of Moscow, Teheran recently also drew closer to Beijing by signing in March 2021 a cooperation pact lasting all of twenty-five years. Last March, Iran also expressed its attention to support the Kremlin against western sanctions. Teheran has already shown that it can commit acts of piracy, as shown by the recent seizure of two Greek oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. In addition, the Islamic Republic has been running a dangerous ballistic programme that last March incurred further US sanctions: a ballistic programme through which the regime of the ayatollahs could theoretically hit different members of the Atlantic Alliance (including Italy).
A fourth problematic element is the risk of an increase in phenomena like jihadism in the Mediterranean area: this is a factor that could be indirectly aggravated by the current crisis in Ukraine. As already mentioned, the Kremlin is using militias from Syria in the invasion of Ukraine and to a certain extent militias from Libya. Last May, the Washington Post reported concerns that groups armed by the Russians could increase instability in the Middle East and North Africa, possibly feeding Islamic terrorist groups.
NATO is thus running great risks in the Mediterranean. It would therefore be advisable for the leadership of the Atlantic Alliance to start paying serious attention to the Mediterranean. This would not mean neglecting the eastern flank but realizing that the two areas are inextricably linked. NATO’s priority objective in the south should therefore be stabilization of Libya, a country that has unfortunately returned to the brink of civil war in the last few months. Firstly, a stabilized Libya would guarantee the European Union a considerable gas supply, making it much less dependent on Moscow for energy.
A stabilized Libya would also avoid the risk of dangerous short circuits. One example is the fact that Italy buys gas from Algeria and Algeria has excellent relations with Kremlin and even voted against the resolution to suspend Russia from the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Secondly, a stabilized Libya could be the occasion to deliver a hard blow against the Kremlin’s influence in the east of the country. In fact, stabilizing Libya would indirectly strengthen the transatlantic community, making sanctions against Russia more effective and weakening Moscow’s influence in the area.
It is clear that these two objectives are bound to be welcomed in Washington. It must not be forgotten that in recent years the United States has been trying to recalibrate its commitments in various areas of the international chessboard to focus more on the Indian-Pacific area and thus meet the Chinese threat in situ. Nevertheless, Russia and China’s political, economic and in some cases military hyperactivity in North Africa must be a source of concern for the Americans. It would be a good idea for Washington to think about NATO’s evolving in a regional direction: such a solution would have at least two advantages.
The first would be a more efficient organization of the Atlantic Alliance: an organization that would enhance all its flanks, finally considering the Sino-Russian challenge systemically rather than in a fragmented manner. The second advantage would consist of relying more on regional powers that because of history, relationships and geographic position may have greater understanding of their geopolitical setting. This could be a decisive factor in avoiding incorrect assessments that risk ending up in botched or poorly executed operations.
It goes without saying that if this approach were adopted the US would have to identify the most reliable allies in each area. It is not at all absurd to consider that Italy could take over this leadership role for the southern flank of NATO. It should be stressed that Washington does not trust France under Emmanuel Macron, who, in addition to calling NATO “brain dead” in 2019, also backed Khalifa Haftar in Libya in the recent past. This is the Khalifa Haftar who, we should remember, has traditionally enjoyed the support of the Kremlin and could thus count on the military support of the mercenaries of the Wagner Group. In this situation, Washington is hardly likely to trust Ankara which, at the regional level is pursuing a deeply cynical policy marked by ambiguous relations with Moscow despite being a member of NATO.
In the light of these understandable American concerns, Italy could play a fundamental role on NATO’s southern flank. This is a desirable outcome but certain definite caveats should be mentioned. First, Rome needs to be ready to shoulder the risks: the challenges in the Mediterranean as we have seen are many and hazardous. Any leadership role in the area must therefore be evaluated with rigorous realism, and bear in mind that our country cannot afford to engage in “toothless diplomacy”: even supposing that dialogue for itself has ever been useful, such dialogue is no longer available as an option today. We need to act. And taking action sometimes means taking risks. The alternative is being sidelined.
Secondly, Italy must avoid those dangerous ambiguities that have sometimes characterized its Mediterranean policy over the decades: Rome’s regional leadership can be relaunched only as part of a clear and firm commitment to NATO.
The common EU defence and the equilibria in the Mediterranean
Apart from the individual military missions and the formal connections between units it is clear that the multinational forces located in the Sahel should reforge links and try to recover terrain lost in Libya also through past political errors. The moment is propitious. The changeover in the White House from Donald Trump to Joe Biden was useful for those trying to make Italy’s Atlantic role a little more solid but without losing sight of the future common EU defence. We do not know whether there will be more US soldiers in the area but we do know that Africom will continue to be operational. And we can boast privileged dealings. We back a European project that sees the African question as part and parcel of the same project. But at the same time, it leaves us free to look to the USA as direct partners. And not just in the Sahel. But also in Iraq and even Lebanon.
In Mosul, on the edge of the Mediterranean, we will have to take over from the Americans in managing the NATO mission tasked with ensuring that Islamic State does not return. Where the responsibility for the mission has been handed over to our servicemen and women. A task that was relaunched, admittedly indirectly, by the recent visit of Pope Francis to the location to again position the Cross in the place where statues of the Blessed Virgin Mary had been decapitated. This was a very important signal for Catholicism and Christianity and a signal that the terrain had been cleared in those years by soldiers’ boots. We basically hope that history will repeat itself, preferably differently. And that over time the Christian presence can return to the area from which it was eliminated, also through the killing of Tariq Aziz, Saddam Hussein’s former minister.
But we hope that the favourable winds for military diplomacy will not stop there. Italy has for some time been in charge of the UNO mission in Lebanon. When he learnt of the withdrawal of an Indonesian ship and of Beijing’s request to send a frigate over the coast of Lebanon a newspaper reported that “Minister Guerini” stepped in to propose an Italian ship. As Italy is responsible for the mission, they are hardly going to say ‘no’ to us”. The signal to the US was clear. We certainly don’t think that in future the Italian Navy might go as far as Taiwan but, in the meantime, it means ensuring that the Chinese don’t dip their toes into Mediterranean waters that are already choppy. Turkey on the one hand and the interests of Egypt and the French moves on the other. Chinese ships have already passed this way and were also in Morocco in 2013. In Djibouti, we have a logistics base and the Chinese have also dropped anchor there to observe the Horn of Africa better. But that is a different matter.
In the stretch of water between Egypt, Cyprus and Israel there are underwater pipes that also convey sensitive information in addition to gas. This is a fundamental link if we want to join up the dots so that from Iraq to the Algerian border all the terrain that was lost after the overthrow of Muhammar Gheddafi in Tripoli is recovered. There is just one piece missing. His name is Abdel Fattah Al Sisi and he has been a frequent visitor to the Elysée Palace lately, which, unlike us, keeps military matters and civilian matters strictly separate. Entrusting the fate of the country even more to military diplomacy can be the right growth lever. The right lever to be a strong NATO partner and at the same time a constructive and active player within the panorama of EU Defence, yet to be built and evaluated.
