
Investments in Cloud, 5G and 6G need to be part of not so much a European as an Atlantic project. Inside this framework, Italy could claim some leverage and again start to engage in product development. That is why the EU’s decision to transform the continent into a digital platform (see decision of February 2020) must be used to protect the entry points so that companies outside the Atlantic Alliance do not exploit EU bureaucracy. In the west, albeit with methods that vary from country to country, we are understandably used to conceiving technological development in terms of market, competition between companies, competition between private individuals (or in some cases between “national champions” with public support). And this is undoubtedly the correct vision. But there is also a “macro” side that cannot be neglected: in other words, there is also complex competition between “systems”, which will inevitably be accentuated by new potential cold war scenarios that face us: on the one hand the countries of the Atlantic Alliance; on the other the countries that, unless they are directly or indirectly part of the Chinese orbit, aim to represent an alternative system to the western bloc.
If that is how matters stand, this has some objective consequences: technological competition will increasingly become a geopolitical challenge, which is why the fact that a western player or – for example – a Chinese player guides the development of a given sector can never be underrated: becoming a driver in leading and strategic sectors will not “only” ensure market success for one operator over another, but will constitute a stage of an overall geostrategic competition. Too many people see the question in terms of a mere technological challenge or straightforward commercial competition: they fail to see that we are facing an existential challenge, a clash of models for global leadership.
In sensitive sectors or sectors with particularly sensitive technology any foreign penetration must be monitored (and in certain cases where there are risks the penetration must be prevented or limited): the question of golden power, its theoretical regulation and its practical application thus becomes increasingly relevant and more systematic and is extending to areas that were once thought to be unaffected.
The principles of the market and competition of course need to be protected, also in order to emphasise the difference between models of an open and liberal society and closed and authoritarian models, but the topic of asymmetries becomes especially relevant: does it make sense to ensure a perfect market for those who – conversely – reject it systematically? And does it make sense to imprudently expose critical and sensitive sectors to penetration by parties that, whatever their formal private judicial connotation, are answerable in and for everything – in their countries – to the public authorities, to governments, to authoritarian and anti-western strategic guidelines? How can the right pragmatic non-ideological balance be struck between opening up the market and exercising due caution?
Both in terms of research and during the production phase, the most important framework for any strategic and industrial policy reflection is not only the European but necessarily also the Atlantic and western framework. In fact, a not insignificant part of political endeavour has to focus on preventing European development (in the fields of security and defence, hi tech, and strategic infrastructures) plotting a “third” curve and orientation between the Atlantic Alliance and Eurasian powers. On the contrary, the admittedly physiological European autonomy must be expressed and developed through harmony and convergence, synergy and complementarity, with respect to other non-EU members of the Atlantic Alliance.
At the same time, in the sectors in which it is more clear that Europe is lagging behind (digital, 5G, artificial intelligence and, pharmaceutical research, just to mention a few macroscopic examples), care must be taken to ensure that – more or less inadvertently – two particularly serious errors are not made: on the one hand, hindering (for different reasons: fiscal, antitrust legislation, etc) the American and English-speaking “champions”; and on the other hand overexposure to penetration by Eurasian operators and players.
And lastly, but certainly not least importantly, national Italian interests must be established in this context: research and development within the Atlantic and western context must be promoted and encouraged; protecting and exploiting in this context Italy’s unique selling points and potential; preventing the merely physiological inter-European competition being resolved on penalizing terms for our businesses and our “champions”, so that they accept a role of followers and subordinates, as happened for example with the aerospace industry.
For all these reasons, the investments and strategic choices in the world of Cloud, 5G and 6G, need to be part of not so much a European as an Atlantic project. And within this framework Italy has to request space and freedom to work and also start developing products again.
The EU’s decision to turn the European continent into a digital platform (also giving citizens “travelling” digital identities on blockchain systems) needs to be interpreted in two directions: internally, whilst appreciating that the digital developments are promising and positive, suitable democratic control must be ensured to avoid technological innovation being used politically to reduce rather than enhance the freedom of individuals, families and businesses.
Externally, the entry points must be protected so that companies outside the Atlantic Alliance do not exploit the characteristics (or possible vulnerabilities and porosity) of the European system. In this context, Melkart will study and develop strategies for merging the world of publishing with the contactless world and the use of microchips, but also more simply try to foster a policy on developing networks and infrastructures by suggesting foreign partnerships mixed with the right dose of local content.
Lastly – but certainly not last in terms of importance – the theme of traditional physical infrastructures, starting from the port system and energy networks. In particular, Italy, on both fronts has been massively exposed to interests and aggressive intentions from parties outside the Atlantic Alliance. These sectors require special attention: they are nerve centres by definition and the search for advantageous opportunities cannot end up in grave strategic errors. Melkart intends to study strategies for merging the publishing world with the hi-tech world to foster a policy on developing networks and infrastructures by suggesting foreign partnerships mixed with the right dose of local content.
Energy and energy sovereignty
The Ukrainian crisis has highlighted the European Union’s energy supply problems. This unfortunate system is reflected in the sixth packet of sanctions.
Reinforcing the Southern Flank of NATO
The current crises are making reinforcement of NATO’s southern flank even more advisable. Such a statement might certainly seem bizarre.
Defence Industry
Common defence will be an important pillar of Italy’s future. Whilst being a part of the European Union, Italy can and must again have a dialogue and direct partnership with the USA.
The legislative aspects, digitalization, energy and defence
Paradoxically, the existing deluge of standards in Italy has not freed our country of gaps, delays and obsolescence.
EU common defense and Mediterranean balances
Beyond the individual military missions and the formalities between departments, it is clear that the numerous flags placed in the Sahel.


